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RECENT DECISIONS
not determine what makes reputation different from other lib-
erty interests, nor did it state how its violation of the presump-
tion of innocence differs from other such violations which have
been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, the obvious
importance of one's good reputation is simply ignored.49
The substantive inadequacy of Paul is the harm it does to
the concept of section 1983. Section 1983 was enacted to be the
procedural mechanism for litigating questions arising out of the
fourteenth amendment, and its purpose is to protect a person's
rights, privileges, and immunities without the restrictions of
other state remedies. The Court has emasculated section 1983
by imposing upon it the limitations of tort law and the necess-
ity of a particular relation to state remedies. Persons with legit-
imate claims such as Davis's are now left without a remedy or
an impartial forum.
GEORGE S. BARANKO
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Non-retrogressive
Reapportionment Plan Upheld-In the recent decision of
Beer v. United States' the plaintiffs, six city council members,2
on behalf of the City of New Orleans, sought a judgment from
the District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that
neither the intent nor the effect of a proposed plan for the
apportionment of the councilmanic districts, which had been
challenged twice by the Attorney General of the United States,3
would abridge the right to vote on account of color or race.4 A
49. See W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Act IlI, Scene 3, Lines 155-60. Who steals my
purse steals trash. . . . But he that filches from me my good name [r]obs me of that
which not enriches him, [a]nd makes me poor indeed.
1. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined; Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision.
2. The action was brought by six of the seven incumbent councilmen.
3. The guidelines established by the Attorney General for the preclearance
procedure of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are contained in 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 et
seq. In order to prevent new forms of racial discrimination these guidelines require the
submission and subsequent approval by the Attorney General of all changes in a
jurisdiction's voting laws.
4. The action for declaratory judgment was brought under § 5 of the Voting Rights
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group of black voters intervened5 at the district court level. The
district court refused to allow the plan to go into effect, holding
first that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving
that the plan would not result in the infringement of black
voting rights and secondly, that the failure to alter the city
charter provision requiring two at-large seats, in itself, had
such a discriminatory effect.
The proposed plan was developed by the City of New Orle-
ans pursuant to its city charter under guidelines established
by the city attorney.' The first apportionment and design (Plan
Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 51 which
provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions
set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under
the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon
determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prere-
quisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting differ-
ent from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, such State or subdivision
may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and
unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice or procedure may be enforced without such a proceeding if
the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been sub-
mitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not inter-
posed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither
the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered
under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under
this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accord-
ance with provisions, of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court.
5. The intervenors were the plaintiffs in Jackson v. Council of City of New Orleans,
Civ. No. 73-1862 (E.D. La. June, 24, 1974), five black voters of New Orleans who sought
a reconstruction of the councilmanic districts based on constitutional grounds. Pro-
ceedings in the case were deferred pending the decision in Beer. See FED. R. Civ. P.
24.
6. 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. Id. at 368 n. 18.
8. Id. at 373. There were five main criteria contained in the guidelines: (1) no two
incumbents in the same district; (2) the districts were to be compact and geographi-
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I) was submitted to the United States Attorney General.'
Objection to the plan came not only from the Attorney General,
who later disapproved it on the basis that it would have the
effect of diluting the black vote, but also from the voters, black
and white alike. The black voters felt that the plan would
effectively prevent them from electing a black council member,
while white voters from the Algiers section of New Orleans,
which is disjoined from the city by the Mississippi River, ob-
jected to being placed in three different districts.'"
A second plan (Plan II) was drawn up to solve the Algiers
problem, but no changes were made to correct the flaws found
by the Attorney General." Plan I was also rejected by the
Attorney General." The plaintiffs then brought this action on
behalf of the city.
The district court found that even though the statistical
data, considered in a vacuum, did not necessarily establish
that the plan was racially discriminatory, the inexorable conse-
quence of the plan would be "a drastic reduction in the voting
strength of the black minority."' 3 The court based this conclu-
sion on the blacks' past denial of access to the political sys-
tem,4 procedures such as anti-single-shot voting'5 and majority
cally integral; (3) districts were to follow traditional political boundaries; (4) bounda-
ries should also follow natural boundaries as well as streets and canals; (5) the districts
were to avoid lines which would divide concentrations of minority voters and thereby
reduce their voting strength.
9. Louisiana is covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as of August 7, 1965. 30
Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965).
10. 374 F. Supp. at 373-74. Under Plan I blacks would be a population majority in
two districts but would be a voting majority in neither. The white population of Algiers
has always been in one district.
11. It is significant that Algiers, which had a population of less than one district
(117,000), was able to force a change in the apportionment plan, while the 267,000
blacks of New Orleans were not able to accomplish a similar feat. 374 F. Supp. at 372.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, 287-92
(1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARS AFrER]. See generally W. MILLS & H. DAVIS,
SMALL CITY GOVERNMENT: SEVEN CASES IN DECISION-MAKING (1962).
12. 374 F. Supp. at 376-77.
13. Id. at 388.
14. Id. at 374-75.
15. Id. at 376. Antisingle-shot voting is the requirement that a voter must cast the
number of votes equal to the number of positions to be filled. The procedure works
against a minority group in a multi-member district because the minority voters can-
not concentrate their vote behind a limited number of candidates, while the votes of
the majority are divided among a number of candidates.
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vote'" and the demographics of the city.'7 For these reasons the
court concluded that the city had failed to meet its burden of
proving that the plan did not have the purpose and would not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of color.'8 The district court also found that the two at-
large seats required by the city charter further diluted black
voting strength. According to the district court, the necessity
of looking at the entire procedure for the election of the seven
member city council outweighed the objection that because the
at-large seats had not been changed since 1954 and were not
being changed at that time, they were not subject to pre-
clearance under section 5.'9
I. BACKGROUND OF VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
Mounting frustration with the obstacles encountered by
blacks in attempting to vote under the Civil Rights Acts of
1957, ° 19601 and 19642 prompted Congress to pass the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.2 Prior to the 1965 Act, the passage of each
new federal law caused some states to enact "new and more
sophisticated tactics to disenfranchise, '2 4 which in turn gener-
ated another federal law. The 1965 Act was an attempt by
Congress to enforce the fifteenth amendment 5 by providing a
formula to determine whether a jurisdiction fell within the
scope of the Act.26 A jurisdiction which satisfied the formula
was then required to have its voting procedure approved either
16. Id. A minority candidate could win a position in a contest with two majority
candidates if the majority candidates split the votes of the majority. However, majority
voting rules would then require a run-off election, thus making it all but impossible
for the minority candidate to prevail.
17. Id. at 368. The black population is heavily concentrated in a series of neighbor-
hoods extending eastwardly and westwardly through the center of the city. The areas
outside the central city are predominantly white. The lines of Plan I, running in a
north-south direction would produce a district with a white majority.
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id. at 399-400.
20. 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
21. 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 20 and 42 U.S.C.).
22. 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 42, and 45 U.S.C.).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19 7 3 -19 7 3 p (1970).
24. McCarty & Stevenson, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: An Evaluation, 3 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 357 (1967).
25. The only other law enacted under the aegis of the fifteenth amendment was the
Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 64, 16 Stat. 140, construed in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
26. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (1970).
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by the Attorney General or by securing a declaratory judgment
from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the
proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color. ' 2  The constitutionality of the Act was
promptly affirmed in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,5 in which
the Supreme Court held the Act to be appropriate in light of
the exceptional conditions that prompted its passage.2 9
Contemporaneously with the nationwide concern for black
suffrage which prompted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its
amendments, the Court entered the "political thicket" of ap-
portionment that Justice Frankfurter had warned against in
Colegrove v. Green." In Gomillion v. Lightfoot3' the Court held
that a district boundary based on invidious discrimination was
unconstitutional. Two years later, in Baker v. Carr,32 the Court
suggested that judicially manageable standards exist for fair
representation in the apportionment areas.3 The standard of
"one man, one vote" was later enunciated in a series of cases
commencing with Westberry v. Sanders34 and Reynolds v.
Sims,35 both of which struck down apportionment plans which
27. 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1970).
28. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV.
79; Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1965); Cox, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 Hous. L.
REv. 1 (1965); Roman, Section Five of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an
Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 521 (1970).
29. During the Congressional hearings on the proposed act, 25,000 people marched
from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama under the protection of federal marshalls to
petition for the right to vote. The effect of this march was evident during the commit-
tee deliberations. Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1965) [hereinafter cited 1965 Hearings];
cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
30. 328 U.S. 549 (1940). In that case, the Supreme Court refused to find a judicially
cognizable claim in a challenge brought by three voters to the apportionment of con-
gressional districts in Illinois.
31. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court held that a claim existed under the fifteenth
amendment when the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, were redrawn into
an irregular twenty-eight sided figure resembling a dragon. This action by the state
legislature reduced the black population of Tuskegee from four hundred to five.
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of a Tennessee
district court and remanded the case for further findings. The district court, relying
on Cologrove v. Green, denied jurisdiction of a challenge to the failure of the Tennessee
legislature to apportion its districts since 1901.
33. Id. at 210. For the purposes of this article the terms "reapportionment" and
"redistricting" will be included under the term "apportionment."
34. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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created serious inequalities in the populations of congressional
and state legislative districts, respectively.36 In the cases fol-
lowing Reynolds, all questions of political representation were
subordinated to the rule of absolute equality of population in
all legislative districts. A strictly numerical approach was suffi-
cient.37
This mathematical rule of equality did not always accom-
plish the basic aim of fair representation that Reynolds had
commanded. 8 By "not coming to grips with the question of
representation,"39 the Supreme Court may have protected the
voting rights of black citizens which could never be used effec-
tively. This problem was recognized in Allen v. Board of
Elections,4 when the Court stated that voting rights can be
infringed by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute
prohibition of casting a ballot.'
The Court's desire to require mathematical equality in sec-
tion 5 preclearance cases was illustrated in Georgia v. United
States.2 The Court held, based on its previous holding in Allen,
that the section 5 preclearance procedure must be broadly con-
strued, and that each covered jurisdiction must review all ap-
portionment plans with the Attorney General or seek a declara-
tory judgment in federal court. As a result of the Georgia deci-
sion, coupled with the results of the 1970 census which forced
many of the political subdivisions covered by the Act to appor-
tion, submissions, to the Attorney General under section 5 in-
creased dramatically. 3
36. Some of the districts varied in population by as much as thirty-five percent.
37. Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?, in
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 217 (N. Polsby ed. 1971). See Hadley v. Junior College
Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
38. 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). See also 26 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1973).
39. Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote'"
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 219, 227.
40. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Amendments in the Mississippi election laws such as an
increase in the number of signatures for an independent candidate to gain a place on
the ballot and changing voting for county supervisors to at-large instead of by district
were covered by the § 5 preclearance procedure.
41. 393 U.S. at 569, citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
42. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
43. In the years 1965-1970, a total of 578 changes were submitted under § 5. During
the period 1970-1974, 3,898 were reviewed by the Attorney General. SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDIcIARY, REPORT ON THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OF 1965 EXTENSION, S-1279, S. Rep.
No. 94-925, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
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The 1970 legislative apportionment in Louisiana gave rise
to several actions alleging racial discrimination.44 The
Louisiana plan was labelled
the clearest example of racially discriminatory gerrymander-
ing of state legislative districts. In addition to the widespread
use of multimember districts in both chambers, the acts con-
tained a great variety of ad hoc gerrymandering devices, in-
cluding divisions of black population concentrations, circum-
scribing blacks into a single, overwhelmingly black majority
district thereby rendering adjacent districts majority white,
and inclusion of remote, noncontiguous areas of white popu-
lation concentration into otherwise majority black districts.45
In Taylor v. McKeithen46 plaintiffs claimed that the Louisiana
districts, although equal in population, served to dilute the
strength of the black votes. The court observed that voting
rights litigation "was leaving the era of reapportionment and
beginning the quest for representative apportionment.""1 It was
this quest for representative apportionment that resulted in the
district court's holding of invalidity in Beer. The plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the judg-
ment of the district court should be vacated and the case re-
manded. The Court's decision reinforced the weight of deci-
sional authority holding that apportionment plans need pre-
serve mathematical equality only.48
II. THE OPINION
A. Dilution of Voting Power
Both the majority opinion and Justice Marshall's dissent in
Beer agreed that the question to be resolved was "when does
an apportionment plan have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color."49
44. The five actions were consolidated for trial. Bussie v. Governor of Louisiana,
333 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. La. 1971), modified and aff'd mem. sub nom. Bussie v.
McKeithen, 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded mem. sub nom.
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972), on remand, 499 F.2d 893 (1974).
45. Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative
Redistricting, 22 PUB. L.J. 37, 52-53 (1973). Stanley Halpin, one of the authors, was
the attorney for the intervenors in the instant case.
46. 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 910.
48. The disparity between the most and least populous of the districts was 1,631
people or 1.4 percent. 374 F. Supp. at 386.
49. 425 U.S. at 139, 145.
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The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Stewart,
treated the question as merely one of statutory interpretation.'
The majority relied on both the legislative history of the Act
and South Carolina v. Katzenbach5' for the proposition that
the Voting Rights Act was intended to "rid the country of racial
discrimination in voting. 5 2 The majority devised a twofold test
for section 5 cases to determine whether an abridgement of
suffrage exists. The first step requires determining whether the
proposed change would lead to a "retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise."53 Assuming no retrogression, the second
step requires determining whether the plan is nevertheless un-
constitutionally discriminatory on the basis of race or color
under the fourteenth amendment.-4 Only after these threshold
questions are answered can the court make its determination
regarding the constitutionality of a proposed apportionment
plan.
Once the Beer majority thus determined a standard by
which an apportionment plan must be scrutinized, it further
concluded that mere examination of the statistical data was a
sufficient basis for such a determination. Since Plan II resulted
in a black voting majority in one of the two districts with black
population majority,55 and since, taking straight racial voting
as an undisputed fact, a black could therefore be elected to the
council, a feat never accomplished under the old apportion-
ment of the city, the Court upheld the plan: "It is not possible
to enhance the political position of racial minorities, as was
done here, and still suffer a dilution or abridgment of the right
to vote."56
50. 425 U.S. at 139.
51. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
52. 425 U.S. at 140, citing South Carolina v. Katzenback, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1965).
53. 425 U.S. at 141.
54. Id. n.12; cf. 1975 Hearings, supra note 43 at 19, where the Senate Judiciary
Committee termed a separate determination of "population inequality" and preclear-
ance under § 5 a correct application. Gaillard v. Young, C.A. No. 74-1265 (D. S.C. June
11, 1975).
55. Districts B & E had black population majorities of 64.1 percent and 50.6 per-
cent, respectively. There was a 52.6 percent black voting majority in district B. The
dramatic effect of Plan I1 was demonstrated by the increase in district B's black voting
majority from 50.2 percent in 1961 to 52.6 percent in Plan I, while district E's black
resident population changed from a minority of 49.4 percent to a majority of 50.6
percent. 425 U.S. at 150 n. 7.
56. Id. at 141.
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However, the majority's analysis of "dilution" is questiona-
ble. For the proposition that section 5 was aimed at circum-
venting the dilution of voting power, the majority cited Perkins
v. Matthews.57 However, the concept of dilution was not a novel
one for the Court. In Reynolds, the Court itself announced that
the "right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilu-
tion of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."" Yet the Court
actually avoided considering any evidence of dilution59 in the
instant case. In portraying the political situation in New Orle-
ans, the district court noted that "[t]he large numerical
strength of the black community and its much weaker propor-
tional voting power" 0 was a major problem. Under proposed
Plan II, the situation would not improve, and the strength of
the black vote would be much lower than its 34.5 percent po-
tential. In response to this allegation, the Supreme Court cited
Whitcomb v. Chavis,1 which held there was no "federal right
to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion to [a
minority's] number in the general population." 2 However,
Whitcomb is easily distinguished, since the Whitcomb Court
based that rule on a finding that "no past denial of access to
the political process"63 occurred. However, in Beer both the
district court and the Supreme Court dissents catalogue the
facts creating a denial of access to the political process.64 Jus-
tice White suggested that the lawmakers were "quite aware of
whether the districts that they created [would] be white or
black."65 The dissents underscored the naivete of the Court's
view of discriminatory voting practices. By failing to take into
account more than the statistics, the Court failed to recognize
57. 400 U.S. 379 (1971). The change from a ward to an at-large system for election
of aldermen was found to be covered by § 5. See generally Derfner, Discrimination and
Voting, 26 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1973).
58. 377 U.S. at 556. See also Banzhaf, Multi-member Electoral Districts - Do
They Violate the "One Man-One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966); Dixon &
McKay, Election Districts: Substantial Population Equality and Exceeded
Expectations, 1 Hum. RIGHTs 74 (1970-2); 26 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1973); 4 MEMP. ST. U.
L. REv. 565 (1974); 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 447 (1975).
59. 425 U.S. at 144, 161.
60. 374 F. Supp. at 368.
61. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
62. 425 U.S. at 136 n. 8.
63. 403 U.S. 124, 155-56 (1971).
64. See notes 14 and 59 supra.
65. 425 U.S. at 144.
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that "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrim-
ination should be nullified." 6 The majority made no determi-
nation of whether the intent of the draftsmen of the New Orle-
ans plan were "racially neutral" 7 or whether they made only
minimal efforts to avoid overt discrimination.
The Beer majority, while ruling on the matter of dilution of
voting power, refused to consider the question of proportional
or compensatory apportionment. This requires a political sub-
division to take affirmative action to remedy past voting ine-
quality in future apportionments. In Taylor v. McKeithen" the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit talked of "a strong case
being made for the use of purposeful judicial racial gerrymand-
ing to afford blacks fair representation in the legislature." 9 The
permissibility of compensatory apportionment has aroused
much debate." It was the hope of the Fifth Circuit that the
Supreme Court would deal directly with that issue in Beer.7
However, the Court declined.
B. Burden of Proof
In his dissent, Justice Marshall borrowed freely from equal
protection concepts contained in cases arising under the four-
teenth amendment." While this approach is not totally justi-
fied by either the legislative history of the fifteenth amend-
ment73 or the Voting Rights Act,74 some case law75 supports this
position. Justice Marshall indicated that the proper test for
66. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
67. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 334 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis deleted).
68. 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 911.
70. See REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's (N. Polsby, ed. 1971); Wildgen, Measuring
Malapportionment in Louisiana, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 383 (1969); 5 IND. LEGAL F. 167
(1971); 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 472 (1970); 25 STAN. L. REV. 84 (1972).
71. 499 F.2d at 910-11.
72. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972); See also Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
73. During the debates on the fifteenth amendment Senator Howard of Michigan,
who introduced the fourteenth amendment in the Senate, stated, "This is the first time
it ever occurred to me that the right to vote was to be derived from the fourteenth
[article]." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. S.p. 1003 (1869).
74. "The basis of the fourteenth amendment is not only unnecessary but also
makes the defense of the constitutionality [of the Act] more difficult." Remarks of
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United States. 1965 Hearings,
supra note 29, at 66.
75. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 (1971).
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scrutinizing an apportionment plan under section 5 must be
based on constitutional standards taken from both section 5
and equal protection cases. The test Marshall proposed was, in
reality, the strict scrutiny-equal protection test. " According to
Marshall, the first object of the Court's analysis should be the
effect of the plan itself. Then,
if the proposed redistricting plan under-represents minority
group members, the burden is on the covered jurisdiction to
show that "the political process leading to nomination and
election were. . . equally open to participation by the group
in question. . . ." If the jurisdiction cannot make such a
showing, then the proposed plan must be rejected, unless
compelling reasons for its adoption can be demonstrated. 7
Marshall's approach is here consistent with the concept of
the shifted burden of proof first adopted for section 5 cases in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach.71 One of the major purposes of
section 5 was to shift the burden of proof "from the discrimina-
tee to the discriminator. ' 79 The burden on the state was estab-
lished in South Carolina to be a substantial one."0 Thus, in
Georgia v. United States,"1 the Court sustained the action of
the Attorney General invalidating an apportionment plan on
the basis that he "could not conclude" that it did not have a
discriminatory racial effect on voting.
In Beer, the Supreme Court's decision did not directly ad-
dress the question of who carries the burden of proof.82 How-
ever, in a final footnote, the Court stated that the plan was not
unconstitutional and "[t]he United States made no claim
that Plan II suffers from any such disability."8 3 If the inference
to be drawn from these statements is that the federal govern-
ment has the burden of proof of discrimination, then the Court
has destroyed the heart of the Act. Justice Marshall attempted
to clarify the Court's position as stated in the footnote. He
76. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
77. 425 U.S. at 157-58 (footnotes omitted).
78. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
79. 425 U.S. at 147-48.
80. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 380-81 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
81. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
82. The district court decision and the two dissenting opinions mentioned the
burden question, but it was not mentioned in the opinion of the majority.
83. 425 U.S. at 142 n. 14.
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suggested that the majority's position was that the United
States had the burden of pleading, while the state had the
burden of proof.8 4 However, this amplification is not conclusive,
and as a result, Beer has cast doubt on the traditional view of
who carries the burden of proof in section 5 cases.
C. At-Large Positions
The Beer decision left another important question unan-
swered. In Georgia v. United States the Court reserved the
question of "whether a district in a proposed legislative reap-
portionment that is identical to a district in the previously
existing apportionment may be subject to review under § 5."8
In Beer both the majority and the dissent addressed the status
of the at-large seats. The intervening black voters contended
that the at-large seats should also be subject to the preclear-
ance review.86 On reargument, the United States conceded that
the seats were not subject to review under section 5.87 With that
concession, the majority then considered the city council as
having only five members instead of seven members. Simple
mathematics shows the significance which such a change in the
number of total seats under review would have on the determi-
nation of racial discrimination in the apportionment plan juris-
diction."8 While Justice Marshall agreed that the two seats were
not before the Court for approval, he stated that Plan II should
not be assessed "without regard to the seven-member council
it [was] designed to fill."89 Marshall further pointed out the
danger inherent in the Court's tactic:
The Court's approach of focusing only on the five districts
would allow covered municipalities to conceal discriminatory
changes by making them a step at a time, and sending one
two- or three-district alteration after another to the Attorney
General for approval. If nothing beyond the districts actually
before him could be considered, discriminatory effects could
84. Id. at 153 n. 12.
85. 411 U.S. at 535 n. 7.
86. It is significant that the determination of Beer by the district court was cited
with approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee when it was deliberating the exten-
sion to the original Act. "Section 5 require[d] the submission of the entire seven
member plan .. " 1975 Hearings, supra note 43, at 19.
87. 425 U.S. at 138.
88. Id. at 157 n. 18 & 158 n. 19.
89. Id. at 158.
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be camouflaged and the prophylactic purposes of the Act
readily evaded."
Thus, by refusing to review the status of the at-large positions,
the Beer majority adopted a procedure permitting the avoid-
ance of the purpose of the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
The reasoning of the Court in Beer will affect voting rights
litigation in several ways: First, courts will continue to accept
the "retrogression" test. This test would permit the absurd
situation of a black population majority in New Orleans by the
1980 census, but an apportionment plan which gives only one
council seat to a district with a black voting majority. Accord-
ing to the Court's reasoning, since no retrogression occurred,
the plan would be constitutional.
The second effect of Beer is to cast uncertainty on the ques-
tion of who carries the burden of proof in section 5 cases. But
most importantly, Beer encourages a minimalistic approach to
the problem of voting discrimination. In testifying during hear-
ings on the original Voting Rights Act, former Attorney General
Katzenbach stated: "The lesson is plain. [The Civil Rights
Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964] have had only minimal effect.
They have been too slow."91 Only further litigation will deter-
mine whether the Court's decision in Beer v. United States has
"slowed" the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in general, and section
5 specifically, to the point of ineffectiveness.
ROBERT S. BERMAN
Constitutional Law - Tenth Amendment - Fair Labor
Standards Act - Minimum Wage Requirement Held In-
applicable to State Employees - Since the United States
Supreme Court's abrupt reversal of direction in 1941 in United
States v. Darby' the power of Congress to regulate private per-
sons and corporations under the commerce clause2 has been
90. Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
91. 1965 Hearings, supra note 29, at 4.
1. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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